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Abstract
Background: Pay for Performance (P4P) mechanisms to health facilities and providers are currently being tested in
several low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) to improve maternal and child health (MCH). This paper reviews
the existing evidence on the effect of P4P program on quality of MCH care in LMICs.
Methods: A systematic review of literature was conducted according to a registered protocol. MEDLINE, Web of
Science, and Embase were searched using the key words maternal care, quality of care, ante natal care, emergency
obstetric and neonatal care (EmONC) and child care. Of 4535 records retrieved, only eight papers met the inclusion
criteria. Primary outcome of interest was quality of MCH disaggregated into structural quality, process quality and
outcomes. Risk of bias across studies was assessed through a customized quality checklist.
Results and discussion: There were four controlled before after intervention studies, three cluster randomized
controlled trials and one case control with post-intervention comparison of P4P programs for MCH care in Burundi,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, the Philippines, and Rwanda. There is some evidence of positive effect of P4P only
on process quality of MCH. The effect of P4P on delivery, EmONC, post natal care and under-five child care were not
evaluated in these studies. There is weak evidence for P4P’s positive effect on maternal and neonatal health outcomes
and out-of-pocket expenses. P4P program had a few negative effects on structural quality.
Conclusion: P4P is effective to improve process quality of ante natal care. However, further research is needed to
understand P4P’s impact on MCH and their causal pathways in LMICs.
Trial registration: PROSPERO registration number CRD42014013077.
Keywords: Pay for performance, Quality of healthcare, Maternal and child health, Low- and middle income countries
Background
Pay for performance (P4P) is an emerging health sector
strategy to improve availability, quality and utilization of
essential healthcare services. P4P aims at incentivizing
performance of the providers and clients for uptake of key
services and behavior changes [1]. P4P belongs to the cat-
egory of innovative financing mechanisms that includes
similar type of payment systems such as results based fi-
nancing, performance-based financing, performance-
based contracting, output-based aid, conditional cash
transfer and cash on delivery [1]. In supply-side P4P, in-
centives are provided to achieve a pre-agreed set of results
(outputs and outcomes) by improving the performance of
health workforce and health facilities [2] and involves a
strict monitoring of results in a stipulated time-frame.
Typically, performance in a P4P program is measured
through health outcomes, utilization of services, and
quality of care [3]. Though P4P has been widely imple-
mented in both high- and low-income settings, its primary
focus and trajectory are context specific [3]. In low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs), P4P is commonly used
to achieve unmet millennium development goals (MDG)
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4 and 5 on maternal and child health (MCH) [4]. How-
ever, the exiting knowledge on the effects of P4P is lim-
ited to utilization of a few services than quality of care
[4]. Even in high-income countries, rigorous evidence
on the effect of P4P on quality of care is limited [5–8].
Several LMICs in Asia and Africa have experimented
P4P to improve MCH since 1990s, mainly to mitigate
the burden of maternal and child conditions [4, 9, 10].
Clinical evidence indicates that quality of MCH care is a
pre-requisite to reduce maternal and child mortalities
[11]. An increased uptake of MCH services such as
skilled birth attendance and newborn care without
adequate quality cannot guarantee an improved MCH
status [12]. Studies conducted in Cambodia, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Haiti have demon-
strated improvements in maternal and child healthcare
service utilization and to some extent better financial
and management capacities with health facilities [13].
There is no synthesized evidence supporting the positive
effect of P4P on quality of care. In addition, a systematic
review conducted on P4P in LMICs asserts that the
evidence is weak to conclude the impact of provider in-
centives on quality of care [4]. If P4P positively impacts
only service utilization without corresponding improve-
ments in quality of care, current investments on P4P in
low-income countries may not be cost-effective to im-
prove MDGs 4 and 5 [3]. In this systematic review, we
assessed the effect of supply-side pay for performance
on the quality of maternal and child health services in
LMICs. While identifying the knowledge gaps in this
area, we also explored the appropriateness of methods
adopted by different studies to measure quality of MCH
care under P4P.
Defining quality of healthcare: definition and measures
Institute of Medicine (IOM) defines quality in healthcare
as the “degree to which health services for individuals
and populations increase the likelihood of desired health
outcomes and are consistent with current professional
knowledge” [14]. Donabedian describes healthcare ser-
vice delivery as a continuum which includes structures,
processes, and outcomes and asserts quality of care is an
end product when the structures are translated to out-
comes through the processes [15]. In the service delivery
continuum, there is equal emphasis on each of the above
mentioned aspects of quality. Structural quality consists
of human and key material resources such as infrastruc-
ture, equipment, drugs and supplies, communication,
and transport. Apart from having the needful material
resources, it is also essential that they are put to practice
to provide services. To deliver optimal quality of care,
adequately skilled and motivated human resources
should be available [15]. Process simply means whether
services are provided optimally and safely following the
standards of service delivery through technical and
non-technical performance [15]. Technical perform-
ance entails delivering scientifically proven services at
the appropriate time. For instance, during routine ante-
natal visit, a woman should undergo weighing; testing
of blood and urine samples for infection and signs of pre-
eclampsia; palpation of abdomen; and measurement of
blood pressure and abdominal girth. Non-technical per-
formance relates to interpersonal relationship, provider
behavior, privacy, and confidentiality [13, 16–18]. Key con-
sequences of the service delivery such as morbidity,
mortality, out-of-pocket expenses, and client satisfaction
constitute the outcomes [12]. In this review, we adopt
Donabedian’s definition of quality in healthcare.
Methods
Protocol and registration
This study is registered with the PROSPERO international
prospective register of systematic reviews (registration
number CRD42014013077) [19]. A peer-reviewed proto-
col guided the conduct of review. This review is reported
as per PRISMA guidelines [20].
Selection of studies
Studies from low- and middle-income countries as de-
fined by the World Bank income criteria were included
[21]. Two of the authors (AD and SG) independently
searched the literature, screened abstracts and retrieved
full papers. Final selection of studies against the inclu-
sion criteria was done independently by these authors
and disagreements were resolved through a consultative
process.
Inclusion criteria
1. Evaluation reporting results of any supply-side (i.e.
facility/provider) P4P on a quantitative measure of
MCH care quality
2. Study conducted in low- and middle-income countries
3. Published in English between January, 1990 and
June, 2014. This selection is based on the fact that
P4P programs started from the 1990s.
4. Presence of at least one comparison group
5. Study reporting statistical significance of the
intervention than only descriptive analysis
6. Study meeting a minimum quality score of six,
defined by two reviewers
Exclusion criteria
1. Study presenting the impact of P4P on only access
to and usage of MCH care without any quality of
care measures
2. Qualitative study or review
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3. Study on P4P presenting non-MCH care
4. Study reporting only descriptive analysis
5. Study with a quality score of less than six
Type of studies
Studies were selected if they met the criteria used by the
Cochrane Effective Practice and Organization of Care
group (EPOC) [22]. The EPOC study designs are: ran-
domized controlled trials (RCTs), clustered randomized
controlled trials (c-RCT), controlled clinical trials
(CCT), controlled before-after studies (CBAs) and quasi-
experimental studies including interrupted time series.
Given the dearth of literature on P4P and quality of
MCH care, in addition studies having at least one inter-
vention and one comparison group were included.
Types of participants
Study population comprised of women during pregnancy
and post-partum period; children younger than five years;
and health workers under assessment for a P4P program.
Type of interventions
P4P interventions in public or private sector, providing
conditional financial incentives to facilities and/or pro-
viders to achieve certain performance measures on MCH
services including quality were selected.
Operational definitions
Maternal health care included any routine or illness care
received during the antenatal, delivery and postpartum
period. Child health care included any care received from
birth up to five years of age for any routine or illness con-
ditions. Health workers were defined as medically trained
personnel (doctors, clinical officers, midwives, and nurses)
working at a primary or secondary care level in LMIC
settings.
Outcomes of interest
Primary outcome of interest was quality of MCH disaggre-
gated into structural quality, process quality and out-
comes. Under structural quality, we considered availability
of health facility infrastructure, skilled staff, equipment,
commodities, and drugs. For process quality, we included
adherence to standard protocols and guidelines for man-
agement of health conditions. Morbidity, mortality, out-
of-pocket expenses for medical services in the healthcare
facility, and client satisfaction constituted the outcomes.
Information sources and search
Records were searched in several electronic search
engines and databases namely MEDLINE, EMBASE,
Global Health, PsycINFO, Econlit and Web of Science.
Additionally, Google Scholar was searched electronically.
Websites of key organizations involved in P4P programs
(World Bank, DFID and NORAD) were purposively
searched for published articles or working papers. A hand
search enabled to retrieve certain relevant papers from the
selected records. Contacts were made to authors and
scholars in the field of P4P to identify additional studies.
The literature search was conducted during May-
August 2014. Records published between January, 1990
and June, 2014 were selected. Each database had different
search words as a combination of MeSH (medical subject
heading) and non-MeSH terms using Boolean operators
“AND” and “OR”. The search algorithm was developed
based on a preliminary search in PubMed and Google
Scholar. The thematic search words are given in Table 1.
Data items and extraction
Country and year of study, study settings and design,
sample size, type of incentive (recipient, conditionality
and frequency), comparison groups, outcome measures,
and quality element of the outcome measures were ex-
tracted using a data extraction form. The primary author
extracted the data and a second author validated the
process.
Summary measures and data synthesis
Where possible we presented either odds ratio or coeffi-
cient along with the confidence interval. Net effects of the
interventions were calculated as the difference between
intervention and control groups at baseline and follow up,
and presented as percentage points, coefficients or abso-
lute numbers in natural units. We considered an outcome
statistically significant at 5 % level (p < 0.05). The reported
outcomes were presented by the elements of quality, i.e.
structure, process and outcomes. Due to heterogeneity of
Table 1 Search strategy
Thematic Search
“provider performance” OR “provider incentives” OR “pay for performance”
OR “performance-based financing” OR “performance-based incentives” OR
“supply-side incentive” OR “provider performance” OR “results-based
financing”
AND
“quality of care” OR “clinical standards” OR “structural quality” OR
“process quality”
AND
“Maternal health/” [MeSH] OR “ante natal/pre natal” OR “post natal/
postpartum” OR “child birth/delivery/institutionalized” OR “newborn/
neonatal” OR “immunization/vaccination” OR “children/child” OR
“nutrition/stunting/anemia”
Adjunct Search
“Developing countries/less developed nations/third world countries”[MeSH]
OR “developing health Systems” [MeSH] OR Africa/sub-Saharan africa”
[MeSH] “Central/south/latin america”[MeSH] OR “asia/central/south east
Asia”[MeSH] OR “commonwealth of independent states”[MeSH] OR “indian
ocean islands”[MeSH] OR “eastern europe”[MeSH] OR “south asia” OR “low
income countries/low and middle income Countries”
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studies and presentation of results, no meta-analysis could
be performed.
Appraising methodological and reporting quality of
included studies
We developed a customized quality assessment tool for
appraising methodological quality of studies, adapted from
Downs and Black [23]. The quality tool took into account
methodological quality (randomization, baseline balance
of key variables), external validity (representativeness of
study sample, contamination of interventions), and report-
ing quality (clear description of objectives, interventions,
outcomes, power calculations, findings). Our adaptation
was reflected in scoring various types of studies with the
highest score assigned to RCTs, replacing representative-
ness of patients with facilities, and removal of items re-
lated to blinding of randomization and patient adverse
events. There were 18 quality indicators for RCTs and 17
for CBAs and each indicator had an indicative score.
Wherever the description did not include a particular item
mentioned in the quality assessment tool or it was unclear,
we scored that item zero. Because of the variation in scor-
ing between studies (i.e. RCT and CBA), we standardized
the absolute scores to percentage to ensure comparability.
Based on the aggregate quality score, studies were ranked
as low (<34 %), moderate (34-66 %) and high (>66 %).
Two of the authors (AD and SG) independently assessed
the quality of studies, with any disagreements resolved
through discussions.
Results
Study selection
Search from the databases identified 4535 records, and an
additional 113 records were retrieved from other sources
and personal communications with researchers. Screened
records were 188 after removing duplicates and excluding
records that did not mention P4P and quality. From 13 ar-
ticles eligible for full-text assessment, only eight were in-
cluded in the review. Details of the study selection are
given in the Fig. 1.
Study characteristics and settings
There were four CBAs, three cluster RCT and one case
control with post-intervention comparison [24–31] of P4P
programs on MCH care in Burundi, Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC), Egypt, the Philippines, and Rwanda
(Table 2). Five studies took place in primary care health
centers [24–27, 31], two reported results from district
level hospitals [28, 29] and one was conducted in both pri-
mary and secondary level facilities [30].
Two cluster randomized trials of performance based
salary bonus to health care providers were reported from
the Philippines [28, 29]. In these two RCTs, 30 district
hospitals from districts matched by socio-economic,
demographic and health profile were randomized to one
of the two intervention arms or to the control arm. In
the cluster randomized trial in DRC, 96 health facilities
in one district were randomly assigned to intervention
and control arms [30]; the intervention arm received
performance-based incentives, while control arms only
input-based financing.
The CBA in Rwanda randomly assigned 80 health
facilities from 12 districts to receive a P4P intervention
and 86 health facilities from seven districts to receive
an equivalent input-based financing [27]. The CBA of
a P4P program in DRC [24] allocated two districts to
receive performance-based incentives and compared
the outcomes with another two districts having similar
socio-economic characteristics. From Egypt, a post-test
only comparison study that assessed a P4P program in
primary health centers receiving incentives for more
than two years [31] was reported. Comparison groups
received equivalent additional incentives as salary top-
off without any performance conditionality. Two stud-
ies of P4P program were reported from Burundi. One
study used a CBA for the pilot phase [26] and the sec-
ond study compared population level outcomes on
quality of antenatal care between P4P and non-P4P
provinces in the nation-wide roll-out phase [25].
Characteristics of performance measures and payments
on quality of care
Studies described diverse performance measurement
and payment mechanisms for quality of care. Perform-
ance mechanisms included achieving a certain level of
volume and quality of MCH services. Three programs
incentivized quality of care with limited set of indices
[26–29, 32]. Three others utilized a composite index in-
cluding availability of human and material resources,
compliance to national standards, proper record keep-
ing, and client satisfaction [24, 30, 31].
Payment systems included payment for individual
health workers [28, 29, 31] or for facilities [24–27]. In-
centives accounted for 5 % of physician’s salary in the
Philippines [29] and 275 % times the base salary of a pri-
mary health facility staff in Egypt [31]. In DRC, the
monthly payments to facilities ranged from $200 to
$4000 [24].
In DRC, apart from incentivizing utilization of MCH
services, the program offered a bonus of up to 15 % of
the subsidies to facilities on quality of care [24]. Per-
formance indicators in Egypt consisted of preventive,
curative and quality of care measures (completeness of
medical records, patient satisfaction and waiting time)
on MCH [31]. The Rwandan program incentivized fa-
cilities on a combination of service volume and quality
for MCH [27]. The P4P facilities in the Philippines
Das et al. BMC Public Health  (2016) 16:321 Page 4 of 11
received incentives linked with the average clinical
competence scores of physicians, facility caseload, and
average utilization of services (quantity) and adherence
to national standards and protocols (quality) [28]. This
adherence to treatment guidelines was assessed for vac-
cinations, family planning, tuberculosis, HIV and ante-
natal care.
Reporting of quality of care in studies
Studies adopted different methods to report quality of care
outcomes. Generally, quality was reported either object-
ively (direct observation of availability and receipt of ser-
vices as per national standards of care) or reported by
patients (e.g. receipt of services, perceptions on staff
attitude, waiting time, quality of services). Means of verifi-
cation of quality were through exit and household inter-
views (patient perception and experiences), review of
records, direct observation (infrastructure, drugs and
equipment) and vignettes. Six studies utilized household
interviews to measure quality [24–27, 29, 30], while two
studies each employed exit interviews [30, 31], review of
records [24, 26], and direct observations [24, 26]. Only
one study applied vignettes as a means of verification [28].
Risk of bias across studies
The mean quality of studies score was 63.8 % with a
range of 41 to 88 %. Two RCTs were of high quality with
a score of 78 % [29, 30] and one RCT had a score of 72 %
Fig. 1 Flow diagram for selection of articles
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Table 2 Study characteristics and Quality score
Author, year;
Country
Study
Design
Program setting Incentives Comparison Group Outcome measures Quality element Methodological
Quality score (%)Recipient Conditionality Frequency
Peabody et al., 2011;
Philippines [28]
CRT 30 District
hospitals (DH)
Providers Physician competence
score, case load and
patient satisfaction
Quarterly DHs from matched
districts without P4P
Quality of care, utilization
of services of children
under-five
Process quality 13(72)
Peabody et al., 2014;
Philippines [29]
CRT 30 District
hospitals
Providers Physician competence
score, case load and
patient satisfaction
Quarterly DHs from matched
districts without P4P
Quality of care, utilization
of services of children
under-five
Clinical outcomes
for under-five
children
14(78)
Huillery and Seban
2014; DRC [30]
CRT 152 Facilities
(primary and
secondary level)
Facilities Utilization of services Monthly Facilities in control
districts receiving
equivalent fixed
payment
User fees, service
accessibility, service
quality and utilization,
population health status,
health facility revenue,
health workers’ satisfaction,
anxiety, motivation
Patient perceived
quality and structural
quality
14(78)
Basinga et al., 2011;
Rwanda [27]
Controlled
before and
after
Rural health
centers - 80 in
intervention and
86 in control
Facilities Utilization of 14 key
MCH services and quality
of services delivery
Quarterly Facilities under input-
based financing
received funds
equivalent to P4P
payments
Prenatal visits, institutional
delivery, quality of ANC,
child preventive care
visits and immunization
Process quality
of ANC
15(88)
Bonfrer et al., 2014;
Burundi [25]
Controlled
before and
after
700 facilities Facilities Obtaining quality and
quantity of services
Monthly for
quantity and
quarterly for
quality
Households in the
provinces where P4P
was not implemented
Utilization and quality
of MCH services
Process quality
of ANC
10(59)
Bonfrer et al., 2014;
Burundi [26]
Controlled
before and
after
700 facilities Facilities Obtaining quality and
quantity of services
Monthly for
quantity and
quarterly for
quality
Facilities in control
districts receiving
normal input
financing and
salary bonus
Maternal and under-
five services
Structural and
process quality
9(53)
Soeters et al 2011;
DRC [24]
Controlled
before and
after
Two districts Facilities Utilization of services Monthly for
quantity and
quarterly for
quality
Two control districts
with characteristics
similar to intervention
districts receiving
essential drugs,
equipment and
fixed staff performance
bonuses
Not mentioned Patient perceived
quality, structural
and process quality
7(41)
Huntington et al.,
2010; Egypt [31]
Case
control
post-test
only
Primary health
centers
Providers Quantity and quality of
preventive, curative and
quality of MCH services
Monthly Primary care providers
in control arms got
flat rate salary
supplements
Quality of ANC, child
care services and
family planning care
Process quality of
ANC, family planning
and child care
7(41)
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[28] (Table 2). Among the five CBA studies, only one [27]
was of high quality, scoring 88 %. Two studies were of
medium quality with a score of 53 and 59 % [25, 26]. Two
CBA studies were of low quality with a score of 41 %
[24, 31].
Five studies did not report baseline participant charac-
teristics, representativeness of the participants or facilities,
estimates of random variability and actual probability
values [24–26, 30, 31]. Three CBAs did not mention
the matching criteria for control and intervention sites
[24, 27, 32]. Studies with selection bias did not consider
the use of instrumental variable techniques to identifying
treatment effects. Seasonality might have confounded the
outcomes in the DRC study as the surveys were con-
ducted at two different seasons [24].
Effects of interventions
Structural quality
Studies gathered results on structural quality from direct
observation and review of records. Four studies described
the effect of P4P on elements of structural quality
(Table 3). The availability of qualified staff increased by
15 % points and patient perceived availability of drugs
improved by 37 % points in DRC [24] compared to pre-
intervention period. In the Philippines, P4P improved
physicians’ knowledge to manage under-five diarrhea
and pneumonia (coefficient 1.6; p < 0.001) [29]. How-
ever, another study showed some negative effects of
P4P on structural quality in DRC [30]. These negative
effects were observed on overall structural quality index
and availability of drugs and vaccines in the facility
[30]. Patient perceived availability of drugs decreased
(coefficient -308.33; p < 0.001). There was a decline in
structural quality index based on interviewers’ observa-
tion (coefficient -0.525; p = 0.014), equipment index
(coefficient -0.639; p = 0.026) and vaccine availability
(coefficient -0.744; p = 0.034). In this study, P4P did not
show any effect on patient perceived equipment quality,
infrastructure index and the number of types of drug cur-
rently available. Patient perceived availability of drugs in
Burundi (coefficient 0.04; p = 0.492) and equipment qual-
ity in DRC (coefficient 0; p = 0.997) did not change under
the P4P program [26, 30].
Process quality
Studies reported process quality results from direct ob-
servation and review of records. Four studies presented
P4P’s impact on various elements of process quality
(Table 4). One study reported P4P’s effect on history tak-
ing and examination of pregnant women during ANC
[31]. Two studies reported the effect on prescription and
treatment of pregnant women and under-five children
[30, 31]. Three studies mentioned about patient reported
process quality on MCH services [29, 32, 33]. The study
in Egypt showed the P4P increased the chances of a
provider asking about parity (coefficient 11.4; p < 0.05)
and past illness (coefficient 16.4; p < 0.01) during ANC
visits [31]. But, the P4P did not significantly influence
the chance of a provider enquiring about a pregnant
women’s name, age and last menstrual cycle. In this
study, P4P increased likelihood of measuring blood pres-
sure (coefficient 8.4; p < 0.01), testing blood (coefficient
12; p < 0.01) and urine (coefficient 20; p < 0.01) during
ANC visits. However, P4P program did not influence the
chances of being weighed or fetal heart rate checked.
The P4P increased provider’s adherence to explaining
medicine intake for children under five years (coefficient
11.1; p < 0.05), follow-up treatment (coefficient 24.2; p <
0.05) and medicines (coefficient 10.5; p < 0.05). Yet, the
program could not improve provider practices on treat-
ment, prescribing iron, injections, vitamins, and tetanus
toxoid for ANC visits. In Rwanda, P4P increased the
ANC quality index in primary health centers (coefficient
0.157; p = 0.02) [27]. In DRC, P4P improved patient’s
perceived quality of care index (coefficient 15; p < 0.05)
and professional quality score of facilities on MCH ser-
vices (coefficient 26; P < 0.001) [24]. Patient perceived
overall quality of care index is the aggregate score given
by the patient for various dimensions of provider behavior
and competence (e.g. how provider explores the case sce-
nario, how provider explains the health condition, how
much respect a provider gives for the patient etc.) Profes-
sional quality score of the facility is a composite score
consisting of structural and process elements as shown
by both studies in DRC and Burundi. However, P4P
program did not influence provider’s adherence to stan-
dardized medical procedure for any MCH service (coef-
ficient -0.015; p = 0.695) [30].
Table 3 Effect on structural quality
Variable Net treatment
effect
P value
Qualified staff in facilitiesa 15 <0.05
Sufficient drug availability (patient perceived)b 0.04 0.492
Provider clinical knowledge on child health
(Mean Vignette score)c
1.6 <0.001
Patient perceived availability of drugs (%)a 37 <0.001
Patient perceived equipment qualityd 0 0.997
Structural quality index based on interviewers’
observationd
−0.525 0.014
Infrastructure indexd 0.184 0.372
Equipment indexd −0.639 0.026
Number of types of vaccine currently availabled −0.744 0.034
Number of types of drug currently availabled 0.236 0.646
aSoeters et al. [24]; bBonfrer et al. [25]; cPeabody et al. [28]; dHuillery and
Seban [30]
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Quality outcomes
Studies obtained results on quality outcomes from review
of records, exit interviews, household interviews and vi-
gnettes. Five studies demonstrated the effect of P4P on pa-
tient knowledge on managing health conditions, morbidity,
mortality, out-of-pocket expense and client satisfaction
(Table 5) [24, 29–32].
Patient knowledge
Number of pregnant women knowing the usage of pre-
natal drugs increased in Egypt (coefficient 12; p < 0.05),
while patient’s knowledge on drug intake decreased in
DRC (coefficient -0.072; p = 0.039) [30, 31].
Table 4 Effect on process quality
Variable Net treatment
effect
P value
History taking
Asked name during ANC visita 4.3 NS
Asked age during ANC visita 4.5 NS
Asked parity during ANC visita 11.4 <0.01
Asked date of last menses during
ANC visita
2.9 NS
Asked past illnesses during ANC visita 16.4 <0.01
Examination
Examined weight during ANC visita 5.8 NS
Examined blood pressure during
ANC visita
8.4 <0.01
Examined fetal heart rate during
ANC visita
10.9 NS
Prescription and Treatment
Asked for blood test during ANC visita 12 <0.01
Asked for urine analysis during ANC visita 20 <0.01
Explained intake of tetanus toxoid during
ANC visita
−8.4 NS
Explained intake of Vitamins during
ANC visita
5 NS
Explained medicine intake for
under-five (%)a
11.1 p < 0.05
Overall treatment procedures (patient
perceived) during ANC visita
−5.5 NS
Drugs prescribed to pregnant women
without examinationb
0.02 0.66
Children received injection (%)a −6 p < 0.05
Children received follow up (%)a 2.4 p < 0.05
Children given medicine (%)a 24.2 p < 0.05
Overall process quality
Compliance rate with medical procedure,
any serviceb
−0.015 0.695
ANC process quality scorec 0.157 <0.001
NS Not significant
aHuntington et al. [31]; bHuillery and Seban [30]; cBasinga et al., [27]
Table 5 Effect on quality outcomes
Variable Net treatment
effect
P value
Patient knowledge
Women knew medicine-use in
prenatal perioda
12 <0.05
Women knew medicine-use in
prenatal periodb
−0.072 0.039
Health outcomes
CRP negative for under-fivec 0.84 0.497
Not anemic under-fivec −4.87 0.253
Good GSRH for under-fivec 7.37 0.001
Weight-for-height z-score of
under-fiveb
−0.347 0.306
Number of under-five deaths last
year in householdsb
12 0.55
Out-of-pocket expenses
Fee paid for the deliveryb 301.24 0.762
Fee paid for the last postnatal visitb −71.637 0.35
Fee paid for the last prenatal visitb −112.969 0.125
Fee paid for the last immunization shotb −22.096 0.237
Cost of drugs purchased by the patient
at facilitiesb
−1106.16 0.005
Client Satisfaction
Felt cured (pp)d 11 NS
Acceptable waiting time (pp)d 7 NS
Respect by staff (pp)d 12 <0.10
Felt cured (coefficient)e 0.09 0.012
Waiting time reasonable (coefficient)e −0.12 0.318
Personnel respectful (coefficient)e −0.02 0.718
Adequate consultation time (minutes)b 1.028 0.422
Pregnant women satisfied on user feesb 0.012 0.48
Pregnant women satisfied on welcome
qualityb
−0.027 0.442
Pregnant women dissatisfied on user feesb 0 0
Pregnant women dissatisfied on welcome
qualityb
0 0.946
Pregnant women satisfied on total
care qualityb
−0.005 0.671
Patient overall satisfiedb 0.013 0.359
Overall quality of care
Overall patient perceived quality
score on ANC (pp)d
25 <0.05
Overall professional quality score of
health centers (pp)d
26 <0.001
Total facility quality score (coefficient)e 17.24 0.062
Patient perceived quality of care (coefficient)e 0 0.924
NS Not significant
aHuntington et al. [31]; bHuillery and Seban [30]; cPeabody et al., [29]; dSoeters
et al [24]; eBonfrer et al. [25]
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Health outcomes
In the Philippines, there was a small improvement in pa-
tient reported health measure for under-five (coefficient
7.37; p = 0.001) [29]. However, P4P had no effect on the
prognosis of acute infections or on the incidence of
anemia among sick children after 6 to 10 weeks of dis-
charge from hospital. Under-five children did not ex-
perience any improvements in their weight-for-height
z-score (coefficient -0.347; p = 0.306), longevity (coeffi-
cient -0.012; p = 0.55) or infants’ survival (coefficient
-0.01; p = 0.093) in the DRC program [30].
Out-of-pocket expenses
In DRC [30], P4P reduced patient out-off-pocket expenses
on purchase of drugs at facilities (coefficient -1106.16,
p = 0.005). On the contrary, there was no significant
effect on fee paid for immunization, delivery and ANC
and PNC visits.
Client satisfaction
Three studies reported how P4P could influence patient
satisfaction on consultation time, provider behavior, wait-
ing time, user fee, welcome quality, overall quality of care
and cure. In the DRC program, no improvement on pro-
vider attitude towards patients (coefficient 12; p <0.10)
[24] was observed. Patients’ chance of feeling cured was
higher under P4P program in Burundi (coefficient
0.09; p = 0.012) [26]. The DRC P4P program did not
affect level of client satisfaction on adequacy of con-
sultation time, overall quality of care, user fee and wel-
come quality [30].
Overall quality of care
Two studies demonstrated the effect of P4P on overall
quality of care of MCH services considering structure,
process and outcome measures (Table 5). The P4P pro-
gram in DRC could enhance the total professional qual-
ity score of health centers (coefficient 26; p < 0.001) and
patient perceived overall quality index (coefficient 25;
p < 0.05) [24]. However, the facility quality score in
Burundi though improved, it was not statistically sig-
nificant (coefficient 17.24; p =0.062) [26].
Discussion
Summary of evidence
This systematic review makes a unique attempt to exam-
ine the effect of P4P on multiple quality of care elements
by using a defined framework. This review found that
the current evidence indicating P4P’s effect on quality of
MCH in LMICs is skewed towards process quality and
antenatal care. Feeble evidence showing P4P’s impact on
quality of MCH care was mainly due to three reasons; 1)
program evaluations did not adequately explore quality
of care; 2) evaluations were mostly not powered enough
to examine quality elements; and 3) P4P could not affect
quality of care to a large extent.
The positive effect of P4P was observed only on lim-
ited aspects of MCH quality elements. Studies focused
predominantly on antenatal care than delivery, EmONC,
post natal care and under-five child care. Strength of evi-
dence on maternal and neonatal health outcomes and
out-of-pocket expenses was also limited. P4P program
fetched a few negative outcomes on structural quality
such as a reduction in the level of availability of drugs
and equipment.
Despite targeting to improve structural quality of facil-
ities, P4P programs could only improve availability of
skilled staff, drugs and provider’s clinical knowledge. On
the contrary, P4P negatively affected availability of
equipment and vaccines [30]. The evidence was consid-
erably positive on provider adherence to treatment pro-
tocols on ANC and child care. Patient out-of-pocket
expenses on MCH did not reduce considerably under
P4P programs, though out-of-pocket costs on drugs
were reduced. However, client satisfaction did not sub-
stantially improve under P4P.
Implications for policy and research
As P4P programs intend to reduce maternal and child
deaths in LMICs, it is essential to demonstrate their po-
tential to improve quality of MCH care comprehensively
than process quality alone. Improving provider adher-
ence to treatment guidelines on ANC alone cannot guar-
antee an improved maternal and child health. Clinical
evidence suggests that quality of skilled birth attendance,
EmONC and post natal care are necessary to reduce ma-
ternal and neonatal deaths [11]. There could be a possi-
bility of insufficient provider skills affecting the process
quality on delivery, EmONC and post natal care [11].
Thus, adequate attention should be given to evaluate the
evidence on other aspects of MCH care.
Ensuring structural quality such as facility infrastruc-
ture, equipment, drugs and supplies is equally pertinent
to offer quality care on MCH [11]. Absence of these
minimum standards can affect patient satisfaction and in
turn reduce demand for services in the long term [11].
Inadequate structural quality could be a reason for the
poor client satisfaction in the studies [11]. Several P4P
programs provided autonomy and funds to facilities to
enhance structural quality. P4P programs in Egypt,
Burundi, Rwanda and DRC also had routinely monitored
structural quality. However, the prevailing positive evi-
dence on structural quality is minimal. The DRC pro-
gram faced negative effects on structural quality index,
as facilities could not spend on infrastructure and equip-
ment due to their reduced revenue under P4P. The ad-
equacy of funds for infrastructural innovations under
P4P programs needs to be investigated. Evaluations of
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P4P programs in high-income settings reflect that pro-
portion of facility revenue is significant to improve qual-
ity of care [6].
There could be also a possibility of limited motivation
and capacity among health workers and managers
restricting innovations on strengthening structural quality,
as evident in many LMICs [30]. Currently, it is unknown
if the prevailing complex procurement system and man-
agerial bottlenecks in the service delivery system to im-
prove structural quality are better under P4P programs.
Otherwise, these inefficiencies could retard structural
quality improvement under P4P [30]. In addition, if there
was no incentive for structural quality improvement, it
could have been neglected with a preference for other in-
centivized indicators (known as cherry picking) [30].
Studies reflect that providers are motivated to improve
process quality of care by adhering to treatment guide-
lines. There could be numerous reasons for their ele-
vated motivation such as financial incentives, regular
supervision, patient feedback and improved facility func-
tioning [33]. Several demand-side financing programs
proved that increased patient load negatively affects pro-
vider efficiency to handle high volume of patients and
this could potentially reduce process quality of care in
due course of time [33]. Thus, specific attention to re-
tain process quality under P4P programs through
optimum provider-patient ratio is needed.
Some P4P programs did not intend to charge user fee,
but patient out-of-pocket expense was not reported to be
lesser under P4P. Additional research is needed to explore
specific cost drivers for out-of-pocket expenses under
P4P. In DRC, facilities could not offset the revenue loss
from reduced user fee as there was not sufficient demand
generation, negatively affecting quality of care [30]. Design
of P4P programs need to approach the issue of utilization
and quality of services comprehensively by addressing
both demand- and supply-side challenges.
Partial positive effect of P4P on quality of MCH care
asks for a deeper investigation into role of design, imple-
mentation and evaluation of P4P programs. According
to a review of P4P in high income countries, quality of
care is the final outcome of the changes brought in by
incentives at provider level, provider group level and
health system level [6]. However, P4P programs in
LMICs do not provide any similar evidence. Further,
there could also be a possibility of preferential attention
to P4P services at the cost of non-incentivized services
or positive spillover from incentivized to non-
incentivized services [8, 34]. None of the studies re-
ported effects on non-P4P services.
Morbidity and mortality are difficult to attribute to the
quality of care delivered because various factors such as se-
verity and pre-existing illnesses, delayed care seeking, and
non-adherence to treatment would affect these outcomes
[15]. Since most of the P4P programs were less than two
years, their evaluations did not potentially have adequate
statistical power to explore the impact on mortality. Also,
results need to be interpreted considering contextual fac-
tors e.g. duration and design of interventions, size of in-
centives, frequency of payment, timing of evaluation,
representativeness of intervention areas and presence
of private providers. Study sites were small and in
some, were not representative of the country. Effective-
ness can be different if intervention is exclusively on
quality than many performance targets as shown in the
studies.
A few studies with CBAs utilized matching of adminis-
trative areas such as provinces or districts [24, 30]. How-
ever, within these administrative areas there were gross
heterogeneity among facilities in terms of infrastructure,
staffing, catchment population and service volume.
These differences can be minimized during the analysis
if further matching of facilities could be performed.
Matching technique such as propensity score matching
which allows for comparison of effects between similar
units can be tried to strengthen the rigor of evidence
[35]. Studies in Rwanda, Egypt and DRC have tried to
balance the financial resource effect across intervention
arms by providing equivalent financing [27, 30, 31].
However, none had attempted to balance the effects of
additional supportive interventions such as supportive
supervision, continuous quality measurement, consistent
use of checklists and operational plans that might have
led to overestimation of P4P’s effects.
Limitations
Most studies focused on other performance indicators
such as service usage along with quality of care, restricting
an in-depth exploration on the latter. This review may suf-
fer from publication bias, as the existing literature may
predominantly include studies reporting positive results.
Despite these limitations, this review has attempted to in-
clude various quality of care elements comprehensively
and explored in-depth.
Conclusions
This systematic review showed that P4P is effective to
improve process quality of ante natal care but not so
effective on improving structural quality, customer satis-
faction, out-of-pocket expenses and maternal and child
health status. Several studies neither explored the effect
of P4P on quality of MCH in-depth, nor were powered
enough statistically. Further research is needed to under-
stand P4P’s impact on EmONC, delivery and post natal
care and their causal pathways in LMICs.
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